The Reconciliation of God’s Sovereignty and Foreknowledge with Man’s Free Will and Predestination
By Desmond Allen, PhD, ThM, MDiv
If you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved (Ro 10:9).
Those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified (Ro 8:29-30).
Man’s free will is an attribute of imago Dei. Being created in the image of God, every individual has the liberty to make personal choices. At the same time, Scripture clearly speaks of saints as having been predestined. The apparent conflict of these two realities has been debated for centuries, especially between the theologies of Calvinism and Arminianism: Does man arrive at salvation by his own free will, or is this the result of God’s sovereignty and predestination? How does God’s foreknowledge fit, and how can all these concepts be true at the same time?
However, because Scripture speaks of God’s sovereignty and foreknowledge as well as man’s free will and predestination, from the theocentric perspective, there can be no tension between them. Therefore, the perceived tension must be the result of man’s myopic anthropocentric theological perspectives. How then do we settle this, so as to understand things from the eternal perspective rather than our temporal, human reasoning? As we read in Isaiah,
My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares Yahweh. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways
and my thoughts than your thoughts (Isa 55:8-9).
Although God’s thoughts and ways surpass our own, he does want us to understand them to some degree. For this reason, God revealed to Paul the mystery of his eternal purpose.
To me,… this grace was given,… to bring to light for everyone what is the plan of the mystery hidden for ages in God, who created all things, so that through the ecclesia the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places. This was according to the eternal purpose that he has realized in Christ Jesus our Lord (Eph 3:8-11).
A Definition of Terms
Admittedly, John Calvin (1509-1564) and Jacobus (James) Arminius (1560-1609) were giants of the faith, but neither was infallible, and none of us have been baptized in their names. Therefore, let us start with an open mind. Because they held different theological positions concerning these matters, it is safe to postulate that one or both either failed to explain their position with clarity or had stretched for implications beyond reality.
We begin with a definition of terms. Not only did Calvin and Arminius arrive at different conclusions regarding foreknowledge and predestination, but they also held different views as to the definitions of both; and each employed special extrabiblical terms to substantiate their positions. For example, Calvin spoke of the effectual calling (which some have referred to as irresistible grace), while Aminius spoke of preventing or preceding grace. Ultimately, these different definitions and terms necessarily add a degree of confusion to the debate.
Calvin on Foreknowledge
Although Calvin’s definition of foreknowledge is concise and definitive, it seems to be more a definition of omniscience than foreknowledge, a particular aspect of omniscience.
When we attribute foreknowledge to God, we mean that all things always were, and ever continue, under his eye; that to his knowledge there is no past or future, but all things are present, and indeed so present, that it is not merely the idea of them that is before him (as those objects are which we retain in our memory), but that he truly sees and contemplates them as actually under his immediate inspection. This foreknowledge extends to the whole circuit of the world, and to all creatures.[1]
Arminius on Foreknowledge
We find Arminius’ definition of foreknowledge following his elaborate and convoluted understanding of omniscience, which begins as follows.
The understanding of God is that faculty of his life which is first in nature and order, and by which the living God distinctly understands all things and every one, which, in what manner soever, either have, will have, have had, can have, or might hypothetically have, a being of any kind, by which he also distinctly understands the order, connection, and relation of all and each of them between each other, and the entities of reason, those beings which exist, or which can exist, in the mind, imagination, and enunciation.[2]
He then proceeds to explain that God’s knowledge is divided into three categories (free, natural, and middle knowledge). He viewed God’s free knowledge as that which follows every free act of the divine will. He equated it with the knowledge of vision; that is, it perceives realized existence—that which passes from mere possibility into actual reality because God chose to create and decree it.
He believed visionary knowledge to be too late in the logical order of divine decrees to explain human choice without determinism.
“Free knowledge, or that of vision, which is also called “prescience,” is not the cause of things.”[3]
He defined natural or necessary knowledge as that mode of divine awareness by which God understands both Himself and all things that are possible. He viewed this as the primary category of divine knowledge.
“The knowledge which is practical and of simple intelligence, and which is denominated “natural,” or “necessary,” is the cause of all things by the mode of prescribing and directing to which is added the action of the will and of the capability.”[4]
He believed this natural knowledge includes everything within the realm of possibility, whether residing within God’s own power or that of a creature. He viewed it as logically preceding every free act of the divine will, so that God does not determine or decree what is possible before knowing it, but this knowledge proceeds naturally from His own infinite nature and omnipotence.
To preserve human responsibility and contingency, and to maintain that God’s infallible foreknowledge does not impose necessity on human choices, he argued for a middle knowledge that is positioned between God’s natural knowledge of Himself and all logical possibilities, and God’s free vision knowledge of what actually happens by divine decree.
“The middle or intermediate [kind of] knowledge ought to intervene in things which depend on the liberty of created choice or pleasure.”[5]
Calvin of Predestination
Calvin defined predestination as an aspect of God’s sovereignty, so that everything happens by the will of God in accord with His eternal, immutable decree.
By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death.[6]
As for man’s free will, Calvin spoke of a doctrine he called the effectual calling (which some have referred to as irresistible grace), wherein God’s sovereign saving grace quickens the dead spirit of some sinners (only the elect), so as to supersede their natural resistance to himself so as to bring them to faith.
This movement of the will is not of that description which was for many ages taught and believed—viz. a movement which thereafter leaves us the choice to obey or resist it, but one which affects us efficaciously.[7]
Speaking of man’s free will, John Chrysostom, Bishop of Constantinople (b. 347 – d. 407), had taught, “Whom he draws, he draws willingly,” which Calvin denied because he believed this implied that the Lord reaches out and then waits for a response. Calvin then argued that such an offer might have worked with man in his original state, but since the fall, man has provided ample example of how miserable a thing free will is if God does not work in us to will and to do. In such a case, of what use is it to us if grace were imparted in such scanty measure?[8]
Arminius on Predestination
When attributed to God, Arminius understood predestination to be His decree for the governance of all things. When understood in a stricter sense concerning the predestination of men, he held that it is usually employed in two ways: sometimes being applied to both the elect and the reprobate, and at other times, being restricted to the elect alone, when reprobation is its opposite.
Predestination, therefore, as it regards the thing itself, is the decree of the good pleasure of God in Christ, by which he resolved within himself from all eternity, to justify, adopt and endow with everlasting life, to the praise of his own glorious grace, believers on whom he had decreed to bestow faith.[9]
Calvinism and Arminianism
Before we proceed, let us rehearse the basic conflict that has arisen between these two theologies, which have come to be known as Calvinism and Arminianism. Each side argues that the other emphasizes one truth to the detriment of, or at least without giving full attention to, the other. As such, Calvin is accused of emphasizing God’s sovereignty to the detriment of man’s free will; and conversely, Arminius is accused of emphasizing man’s free will to the detriment of God’s sovereignty.
Calvinism is generally thought of as a doctrine of supralapsarianism (that God logically decreed both the election of some and the condemnation of others before he decreed the creation of the world or the fall of man), although Calvin never used this term. It was Theodore Beza (1519–1605), Calvin’s student and successor, who promoted supralapsarianism as the logical conclusion of double predestination—that God created some for glory and others for destruction. Many argue that Calvin promoted the notion that God’s decrees of election and reprobation logically followed the decree to create man and allow his fall. This came to be known as infralapsarianism, another term that Calvin did not use. Calvin, however, did adamantly refuse to accept the notion that predestination was subordinate to foreknowledge, for he believed this would compromise God’s sovereignty by making Him a responder to man’s will.
The predestination by which God adopts some to the hope of life, and adjudges others to eternal death, no man who would be thought pious ventures simply to deny; but it is greatly caviled at, especially by those who make prescience its cause. We, indeed, ascribe both prescience and predestination to God; but we say, that it is absurd to make the latter subordinate to the former.[10]
Arminius rejected both supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism because he believed they made God the author of sin, and they were inconsistent with the nature of man, who is created in God’s image. He taught that God, in his sovereignty, chose to govern through relationships rather than absolute causative necessity; thereby, He relinquished certain decisions to man’s free will.
Like Calvin, Arminius adamantly denied that salvation is contingent upon any work or action of man; yet, at the same time, he argued that God determined to save those whom He foreknew would believe, thereby making individual election logically conditioned on God’s foreknowledge of man’s action. He taught that predestination referred to particular individuals based upon their faith, which is conditioned upon God’s foreknowledge of their free choice to believe or not to believe, so that God decreed to save those who will repent and believe, but God does not cause them to believe. He argued that humanity, being totally depraved, was enabled to respond to God by what he called preventing or preceding grace, which frees the human will, thereby allowing a response to God, so that God foreknew who would have faith.[11]
The Weaknesses of Both Positions
The arguments that each side has against the other’s position are valid. Clearly, as Calvin maintained, God is sovereign; his will is not subordinate to man’s will. God is not a passive spectator responding to man’s actions. However, Paul clearly made a sequential connection between God’s foreknowledge, man’s predestination, justification, and glorification (Ro 8:29-30). Therefore, since a connection does exist between foreknowledge and predestination, and yet God’s foreknowledge of man’s future actions cannot be the cause of predestination, which would make God’s will subordinate to man’s will, the question is: What, concerning God’s foreknowledge, if not man’s future actions, is addressed in this passage? Simply denying the continuum between the two is not a valid solution.
On the other hand, concerning this dilemma between foreknowledge and predestination, Arminius proposed that God granted a preventing or preceding grace to everyone in order to free the human will. So, with foreknowledge, God knew who would respond. However, this argument falls apart in two ways. First, there is no evidence or reference to this preceding grace being granted to everyone. Rather, we learn that fallen man does not have the desire or the ability to seek or submit to God, toward whom they harbor hostility and are unable to please (Ro 8:7-8). Jesus himself told the Father that he was not praying for everyone, but only for those whom the Father had given to him (Jn 17:9). Secondly, granting everyone this preceding grace, as Arminius argues, does not solve the dilemma of God’s will being subordinate to man’s will, for in this scenario God is still waiting for man to act.
Then there is Arminius’s attempt to distance God from man’s sin, which seems most unwarranted. Certainly, God is not culpable for man’s rebellion, which man accomplished of his own volition. At the same time, man’s rebellion and God’s mercy upon the chosen is a vital part of God’s eternal plan to glorify himself.
The Eternal Plan
How then do we understand the relationship between God’s foreknowledge and predestination so that both God’s sovereignty and man’s free will remain uncompromised? I suggest an account of unified decrees. Rather than cutting hairs between supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism, this term suggests that the entirety of God’s decrees concerning creation are vital aspects of his eternal purpose, which he ordained before the creation of the world. Arguing that one decree superseded another so as to distance God from appearing to be the author of sin is little more than semantics employed to avoid the issue head-on. None of God’s decrees are arbitrary or designed to mitigate another. His eternal plan, which is solely for God’s pleasure and glory, includes these key elements: creating the universe, creating man in his own image, providing for man’s redemption, which presupposes permitting man’s fall, vanquishing sin, and glorifying himself by revealing several heretofore unseen attributes, which come forth in the aftermath of rebellion.
Until the fall of Lucifer, and then man, rebellion was but an imagined, yet necessary, possibility due to God having created others with free will. Thus, God’s eternal plan would forever annihilate sin so that it would never be seen again (1Jn 3:8; Re 21:1-4), and he would glorify himself in the process. Lucifer’s rebellion (for whom there is no redemption) gave God occasion to reveal his holiness and justice. But man’s rebellion (having been created in God’s image and for whom redemption is possible) gave God occasion to reveal his grace, goodness, benevolence, forgiveness, long-suffering, wisdom, and love, which are now known to all of creation, and God is glorified.
Unified Decrees
Before creation materialized, with sovereignty and wisdom, God decreed every detail of his eternal plan for his own pleasure and to his own glory. This necessitates foreknowledge of every detail, including his own loving redemptive work through his Son, Jesus Christ; and, therefore, his foreknowledge of man’s decision to rebel, thereby severing their relationship with him and making the totality of humanity unworthy, unwilling, and unable to seek him, to place faith in him, or to please him. Yet, also as part of his eternal plan, God also foreknew the heart of every person, the essential character of their soul; thereby, knowing those in whom he could delight and be pleased. Solomon revealed that “Yahweh weighs the heart” (Prov 21:2), and the Psalmists said, God “knows the secrets of the heart…. Yahweh delights in those who fear him” (Ps 44:21; 147:11).
The Lord told Jeremiah, “Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet” (Jer 1:5). There is nothing arbitrary about God’s plan or his choices. The Lord told Samuel that David was chosen because he sees the heart (1Sa 16:70). David cried out for the Lord to judge him according to the integrity in is his heart; and he declared that the Lord has upheld him because of his integrity, and has set him in his presence forever (Ps 7:8; 41:12). With this same knowledge of the heart, concerning the twins, the Lord proclaimed, “Jacob, I loved, but Esau I hated” (Ro 9:13), this having been determined before their birth and having nothing to do with foreseen works, either good or evil, but that the pleasure of God should be fulfilled, for all things are for God’s pleasure and glory. Before meeting Nathanael, Jesus knew there was no deceit in him (Jn 1:47), and he told the disciples, “You did not choose me, but I chose you” (Jn 15:16).
But it must not be construed to say that this residual aspect of imago Dei, an integral quality or integrity of the heart within certain individuals, justifies them in any way, or makes them worthy of God’s fellowship or salvation. For beyond this quality, they are still tainted with sin and judicially condemned as such; thereby, necessarily separate from the holy Creator. Yet, in them, because of this quality, God could delight if they were not separated from him by their sinful nature. Therefore, due to no action of their own, but solely for God’s own pleasure, he graciously chose to show mercy and compassion to those in whom he could delight. Thus, to them, God graciously grants the power of faith, thereby providing them the ability to seek him (Ro 12:3; Jn 6:65; 2Pe 1:1). Having been endowed with the power of faith, the Spirit of God graciously calls them (Ro 8:28; 1Co 1:2). Upon hearing this call, via the power of faith, they exercise the same free will by which they had rebelled, to now humbly accept his calling and seek him. Then, God freely and graciously applies the redemption he provided in Jesus Christ, thereby rendering them justified and pardoned. Now, being justified, and thereby able to have a relationship with God, he makes them holy, setting them apart for his own pleasure.
In this manner, God’s sovereignty and man’s free will remain uncompromised. Although God foreknew the outcome—that those to whom he grants faith and calls will believe—this information is not the cause of their predestination. The basis of their predestination, which is God’s gracious gift of faith and his subsequent calling, is found solely in God’s pleasure and glorification.
Of course, some will object that this does not address the dilemma of double predestination, since God created individuals whom he foreknew would not have an intrinsic integrity in which he could find pleasure. Although this cannot be denied, neither was double predestination the topic of concern. However, concerning this objection, the Apostle has provided the answer. Using the election of Jacob and the rejection of Esau as examples, Paul asks, “What shall we say then? Is there injustice on God’s part? By no means!” For God will have mercy and compassion on whom he will, and he will harden whom he will. Then, anticipating the reader’s reasoning, Paul answered their anthropocentric question, “Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?” He rebukes this reasoning by asking, “But who are you, O man, to answer back to God?” Does the potter not have the right to do as he will with the clay; to make one vessel of value and another of no value? He then proceeds to explain that the issue at hand is the revelation of God’s abundant glory toward the redeemed, the vessels of his mercy, whom he prepared beforehand for glory; thereby returning the argument to the eternal purpose of God’s pleasure and glorification (Ro 9:10-24).
While the anthropocentric worldview of justice may not be satisfied with this explanation, again, we remember that God’s thoughts and ways are not man’s thoughts and ways (Isa 55:8-9). There is much about God and his ways that we do not know; and we do not know the process by which each person attained or developed their individual personality, wherein God may or may not find integrity in which he may be pleased. But we do know that all things are for God’s glory and pleasure, that God searches our hearts, that we are saved by God’s grace by faith, not by works, that God predestined and called us to salvation, that God is sovereign, that we have free will, and that it all makes sense to God.
Conclusion
Calvin and Arminius differed considerably concerning the interaction between God’s sovereignty and man’s free will, as well as the meaning and significance of God’s foreknowledge and man’s predestination.
Both adhered to God’s sovereignty, of which Calvin taught God’s absolute, decisive, determinate control over all that happens, including man’s faith and salvation, while Arminius argued that God voluntarily limited his control to allow for man’s free will and cooperation with his grace.
Both taught that mankind suffers from total depravity, in which the entirety of humanity is guilty of sin. However, while Calvin argued that man is incapable of choosing God unless first regenerated by irresistible grace, in contrast, Arminius argued that God grants a prevenient grace to everyone, which restores their free will so they might choose to accept or resist God’s gracious offer of salvation, and mitigates the condemnation of infants.
Calvin understood God’s foreknowledge to be an aspect of his decree by which he foreknew because he decreed it to happen, while Arminius argued that God’s foreknowledge was a passive omniscience (in that he does not force the human will) as God looked through time and foresaw man’s free choices to believe in him without causing them to do so.
Calvin adhered to an unconditional election, by which, before creation, in his sovereignty and of his own will, having nothing to do with anything foreseen in anyone, God chose to save certain individuals. Arminius, on the other hand, adhered to a conditional election, wherein God’s choice to predestine certain individuals is based on his foreknowledge of who would freely choose to believe in him.
The position presented in this argument for Unified Decrees adheres to the following: Each of God’s decrees concerning creation is necessarily united as part of his eternal plan; none stands alone or is subject to another or mitigated by another. The Sovereignty of God. God’s foreknowledge of all events is a necessary aspect of his decrees. Man’s free will. The total depravity of man, which renders all of humanity condemned, unable and unwilling to seek God or to please him. Man’s predestined election and calling are based solely on God’s pleasure, for God does nothing arbitrarily, and all things exist for his purpose and pleasure. Then, the following factors reconcile God’s sovereignty and foreknowledge with man’s free will and predestination, which neither Calvin nor Arminius considered.
According to his eternal plan, God would forever eradicate sin and glorify himself by revealing various heretofore unseen attributes. Therefore, for his own pleasure, God created man in his image. Because of man’s rebellion, they are judicially condemned and separated from God’s presence. Therefore, in his wisdom, God provided for man’s redemption through his Son, Jesus Christ, who is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world (1Jn 2:2), and he offers redemption freely to anyone who will accept it (Jn 3:15-16). However, being in sin and alienated from God, in his corrupt state void of faith, no one seeks him. Yet, being omniscient, God perceives an intrinsic integrity residing within the heart of certain individuals, in which he could delight if they were not corrupt and judicially condemned for their sin, thereby being separated from his holiness. Therefore, having nothing to do with any action they may or may not do, but based solely upon the pleasure God could have in a relationship with them, in love, God chose to predestine these individuals by graciously granting to them the faith necessary to seek him, and then calling them with the Holy Spirit. Now, having the faith they had lacked, these individuals exercise their free will and respond to God’s gracious call. Herein, God’s sovereignty and man’s free will remain intact without one compromising the other. Although God necessarily foreknew who would seek him, this knowledge was not the cause of their predestination, but a product of it. The sole cause of man’s predestination (i.e., being granted faith so that he could respond to God’s calling) is God’s pleasure and his desire for a relationship with those who possess a certain intrinsic integrity in which he could delight.
[1] John Calvin, The Institutes of Christian Religion, p. 568.
[2] The Works of James Arminius, vol 2, p. 31.
[3] Ibid. p. 32.
[4] The Works of James Arminius, vol 2, p. 32.
[5] Ibid. p. 32.
[6] John Calvin, The Institutes of Christian Religion, p. 567.
[7] Ibid. p. 221.
[8] Ibid..
[9] Works of James Arminius, vol 1, p. 411.
[10] John Calvin, The Institutes of Christian Religion, p. 568.
[11] The Works of James Arminius, vol 1, pp. 309, 367; vol 2, p. 314.